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The paper, as such a draft of a chapter for the second edition of the +DQGERRNRI(FRQRPLF
6RFLHORJ\, Edited by Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg), is meant to offer some sort of 
roadmap across a few fields of investigation concerning the relationships between 
technological learning and economic dynamics. Within this broad critical endeavour, one 
discusses some of the interpretative achievements stemming from e.g. the economics of 
innovation, industrial economics, epistemology of knowledge, economic sociology and 
history of technology among others. In particular, one tries to identify the drivers of 
technological change, possible invariances in the processes of change themselves, their 
social and institutional roots and some properties of the dynamic coupling between 
technological learning, forms of corporate organization and economic evolution. 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
 
In this chapter we address some general properties of technological change and its 
co-evolutionary patterns with the economic and social contexts in which it occurs. 
Of course it would be a futile enterprise to attempt to survey in a single chapter all 
the facets of the relationships between the "modern Prometheus" of technological 
innovation - as David Landes puts it -, on the one hand, and economic development, on 
the other. Rather, we confine ourselves to some of those aspects of such relationships 
with straightforward bearings on social embeddedness - to use Granovetter’s (1985) 
fortunate expression - of the process of generation of "useful knowledge" and its 
economic exploitation.  
Admittedly we shall undertake such an exercise from an evolutionary economics 
perspective: diverse discussions of such a broadly defined research program may be 
found in Nelson and Winter (1982), Hodgson (1993), Metcalfe (1998), Dosi and Winter 
(2002), Nelson and Winter (2002), Coriat and Dosi (2000). For our purposes here, let us 
just emphasize the overlappings between "evolutionary" and a few "socio-economic" 
interpretations of the fabrics and changes of both technological knowledge and economic 
structures. Telegraphically, they all share microfoundations grounded on heterogeneous 
agents, multiple manifestations of "bounded rationality", diverse learning patterns and 
diverse behavioral regularities (much more on that in Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo (1996)). 
At the same time, social embeddedness entails also the long-lasting influences of socio-
economic factors upon the rates and directions of accumulation of technological 
knowledge.  
In this respect intricate puzzles concern "what ultimately determines what...": e.g. 
is resource accumulation that primarily fosters the exploration of novel innovative 
opportunities, or, conversely, does innovation drive capital accumulation? Do new 
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technological opportunities emerge mainly from some extra economic domain ("pure 
science") or are they primarily driven by economic incentives? Or are they crucially 
molded by social interests and politics? Should one assume that the institutions - however 
defined - supporting technical change are sufficiently adaptive to adjust to whatever 
economic inducement emerges from market interactions; or, conversely, are they inertial 
enough to shape the rates and directions of innovation and diffusion? 
A first issue that we shall address in the following concerns the identification of 
possible invariances in the patterns of technological search and knowledge accumulation, 
together with discrete differences across sectors and industries. 
Relatedly, second, a general question regards what one may call the degrees of 
plasticity of technological changes vis-à-vis economic and social drivers as distinct from 
the inner momentum that technology-specific opportunities happen to provide. Pushing it 
to caricatural extremes, what are the constraints to what "money can buy"? And, 
conversely, are there hard "natural" boundaries to what social dynamics may "negotiate"? 
 In any case, third, we shall argue that the revealed economic impact of 
technological innovation crucially depends upon some sorts of combinatorics, entailing 
"matching"/"mismatching" patterns between: a) the opportunities and constraints offered 
in any given period by the major available technologies; b) the structures and behaviors 
of business firms and c) the characteristics of broader institutions governing e.g. labor-, 
finance- and product-markets. 
Our discussion shall begin with a brief overview of some fundamental "stylized 
facts", that is relatively robust historical regularities at different level of observation - 
from the very micro to broad societal ones - which motivate interest in the relationships 
between technological and economic change and also highlight some interpretative 
puzzles. Next, we shall offer our interpretation of the structure and dynamics of 
technological knowledge and tackle a few related debates including those impinging on 
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the degrees of embodiment of technological knowledge within business organization; the 
role of "information" as distinct from "knowledge" stricto sensu; the importance of 
incentive such as appropriability, on the one hand, and various other social processes, on 
the other, in driving the rates and directions of technological innovation. Finally the last 
part of the chapter shall address more explicitly "macro" issues regarding some 
conjectural properties of the mentioned "combinatorics" between technology, economic 
structure and institutions.           
 References in the following to somewhat arcane debates amongst economists of 
different breeds shall be kept to a minimum (with the inevitable downside of a bias 
toward the specific authors’ interpretative perspective). But fruitful interactions with 
economic sociology might hopefully be enhanced.                                           
     
6RPHVW\OL]HGIDFWVRQ7HFKQRORJ\DQG(FRQRPLF'\QDPLFV
7HFKQLFDOFKDQJHHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGH 
•  Since the Industrial Revolution a highly skewed international distribution of innovative 
activities has emerged, starting from rather homogeneous conditions at least between 
Europe, China and the Arab world (Cipolla 1965). 
Table 1 provides a highly impressionistic but revealing picture of the international 
distribution of innovations from 1750. Although there is probably some Anglo-American 
bias in the data, a similar pattern is revealed by long-term patenting activities (see Dosi et 
al. 1990): Innovation appears to be highly concentrated in a small group of industrialized 
countries (Table 2). The club of major innovators has been quite small over the whole 
period of around two centuries and half with both restricted entry (with Japan as the only 
major entrant in the 20th century) and a secular pace of change in relative rankings. 
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•  At the same time, since the Industrial Revolution one observes the explosion of 
diverging income patterns, starting from quite similar pre-industrial per capita levels. 
Bairoch (1981, p.5) presents estimates showing that before the Industrial Revolution the 
income gap between the poorest and the richest countries was certainly smaller than the 
ratio 1 to 2 and probably of the order of only 1 to 1.5. Conversely, the dominant tendency 
after the Industrial Revolution is one with fast increasing differentiation among countries 
and overall divergence (see Bairoch (1981), pp7-8 for evidence). Even in the post World 
War II period, commonly regarded as an era of growing uniformity, the hypothesis of 
global convergence (that is convergence of the whole population of countries toward 
increasingly similar income levels) does not find support from the evidence (De Long 
1988; Easterly et al. 1992; Verspagen 1991; Soete and Verspagen 1993; Durlauf and 
Johnson 1992; Quah 1996). Rather, one finds some - although not overwhelming - 
evidence of local convergence, i.e. within subsets of countries grouped according to some 
initial characteristics such as income levels (Durlauf and Johnson 1992) or geographical 
locations. Still, across-groups differences in growth performances appear to be striking 
high.     
•  A delicate but crucial issue concerns the relation between patterns of technical change 
and patterns of economic growth. Of course, technological learning involves many more 
elements than simply inventive discovery and patenting: equally important activities are 
imitation, reverse engineering, adoption of capital-embodied innovations, learning by 
doing and learning by using (Freeman 1982; Dosi 1988; Pavitt 1999). Moreover, 
technological change goes often together with organizational innovation. Still, it is 
important to notice the existence of significant links between innovative activities 
(measured in a rather narrow sense, i.e. in terms of patenting and R&D activities) and 
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GDP per capita (for the time being we shall avoid any detailed argument on the direction 
of causality).  
•  As discussed in Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani (1994) evidence concerning OECD 
countries appears to suggests that the relationships between innovative activities and 
levels of GDP has become closer over time, and is highly significant after World War II. 
Moreover, innovative dynamism, expressed by the growth of patenting by different 
countries in USA always appears positively correlated with per capita GDP growth. The 
link is particularly robust between 1913 and 1970. (Conversely a sign that the regime of 
international growth might have changed in the 1970s is that in this period the relation 
gets weaker and loses statistical significance). 
•  In general, at least since World War II, the rates of growth of GDP appear to depend on 
(i) domestic innovative activities, (ii) the rates of investment in capital equipment and 
(iii) international technological diffusion (Fagerberg 1988; De Long et al 1991; 
Meliciani 2001). 
•  In turn, capability of innovating and quickly adopting new technologies are strongly 
correlated with successful trade performance (Dosi et al 1990). 
•  Moreover, despite technological diffusion is taking place at a rather high rates, at least 
among OECD countries, important specificities in "national systems of innovation" 
persist related to the characteristics of the scientific and technical infrastructure, local 
user-producer relationships and other institutional and policy features of each country 
(Lundvall 1988; 1992; Nelson 1993; Archibugi, Howells and Michie 1999). 
)LUPVLQGXVWULDOVWUXFWXUHVDQGG\QDPLFV
•  In contemporary economies business firms are a fundamental locus of technological 
accumulation. This is revealed also by the (high and growing) shares of the total domestic 
Research and Development they undertake (see figure 1 on US evidence). However the 
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directions and the rates at which they learn vary a lot depending the sectors in which they 
operate and, relatedly, on the technologies they access (Pavitt 1984; Levin, Cohen and 
Mowery 1985; Dosi 1988; Freeman 1994; Freeman and Soete 1997). 
•  In any case, neither the secularly growing importance innovative search internalized 
within firms, nor the more recent ability by the latter to utilize "artificial" exploration and 
design technologies - from CAD to simulation models - has eliminated the intrinsic 
uncertainty associated with the innovation process. Trials and errors, unpredictable 
failures and unexpected successes continue to be a general feature of technological 
innovation in contemporary economies. 
•  And so continue to be the persistence of systematic differences across firms, even 
within the same lines of activities, in innovative abilities, production efficiencies, 
profitabilities: i.e. what in a short hand are called elsewhere (Dosi 1988) asymmetries 
across firms. For evidence, amongst many others, see Davies, Haltiwanger and Schuh 
(1996); Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992); Baldwin (1995); and the whole special issue 
of Industrial and Corporate Change. A striking illustration of a much wider phenomenon 
is the dispersion of labor productivities even within the same sectors of activity and under 
roughly the same relative prices. See figure 2 for some pieces of evidence from Italy to 
that effect. 
•  Industrial structures and industrial change present a few remarkable regularities, too, 
shared by most industrialized countries. Variables like capital intensity, advertising 
expenditures, R&D and patent intensities, concentration, profitability, firms’ entry exit 
and survival rates remarkably differ across sectors while presenting high cross country 
similarities. Moreover, specific industries display rather similar characteristics, in terms 
of industrial dynamics in different countries. Finally, both industrial structures and 
dynamics appear to be profoundly shaped by the nature of the technologies upon which 
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individual industries draw (Pavitt 1984; Dosi 1988; Dosi et al. 1995; Breschi, Malerba 
and Orsenigo 2000; Marsili (2001) and the evidence cited therein). 
How does one interpret the bulk of the foregoing evidence? For example, why 
technological learning appears, at least at a first look, to be both a driver of economic 
growth but also a factor of divergence across countries and even across firms? More 
generally, how does one link any story primarily focused upon the dynamics of 
knowledge with another one wherein the primary actors are business firms, products, 
markets, etc. and with yet another one primarily featuring non- market institutions? 
In order to begin to address these questions, let us try to characterize the nature of 
technology and technological innovation, as we see it.                 
         
.QRZOHGJH7HFKQRORJ\DQGLQQRYDWLRQVRPHEDVLFIHDWXUHV
7HFKQRORJLFDOSDUDGLJPVDQGWUDMHFWRULHV
A variety of concepts have been put forward over the last couple of decades to 
define the nature of innovative activities1: technological regimes, paradigms, trajectories, 
salients, guidepost, dominant design and so on. The names are not so important (although 
some standardization could make the diffusion of ideas easier!). More crucially, these 
concepts are highly overlapping in that they try to capture a few common features of the 
procedures and direction of technical change. Let us consider some of them. 
 The notion of technological paradigm which shall be for the time being our 
yardstick is based on a view of technology grounded on the following three fundamental 
ideas.  
First, it suggests that any satisfactory description of ’what is technology’ and how 
it changes must also embody the representation of the specific forms of knowledge on 
which a particular activity is based and can not be reduced to a set of well-defined 
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blueprints. It primarily concerns problem-solving activities involving - to varying degrees 
- also tacit forms of knowledge embodied in individuals and organizational procedures.  
Second, paradigms entail specific heuristic and visions on "how to do things" and 
how to improve them, often shared by the community of practitioners in each particular 
activity (engineers, firms, technical society, etc.), i.e. they entail collectively shared 
cognitive frames (Constant 1980).  
Third, paradigms often also define basic templates of artifacts and systems, which 
over time are progressively modified and improved. These basic artifacts can also be 
described in terms of some fundamental technological and economic characteristics. For 
example, in the case of an airplane, their basic attributes are described not only and 
obviously in terms of inputs and production costs, but also on the basis of some salient 
technological features such as wing-load, take-off weight, speed, distance it can cover, 
etc. What is interesting here is that technical progress seems to display patterns and 
invariances in terms of these product characteristics. Similar examples of technological 
invariances can be found e.g. in semiconductors, agricultural equipment, automobiles and 
a few other micro technological studies (Sahal 1981; Grupp 1992; Saviotti 1996). Hence 
the notion of technological trajectories associated with the progressive realization of the 
innovative opportunities underlying each paradigm -  which can in principle be measured 
in terms of the changes in the fundamental techno-economic characteristics of artifacts 
and production processes2. The core ideas involved in this notion of trajectories are the 
following. 
First, each particular body of knowledge (each paradigm) shapes and constraints 
the rates and direction of technical change, in a first rough approximation, irrespectively 
of market inducements. Second, technical change is partly driven by repeated attempts to 
cope with technological imbalances which itself creates3. Third, as a consequence, one 
should be able to observe regularities and invariances in the pattern of technical change 
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which hold under different market conditions (e.g. under different relative prices) and 
whose disruption is mainly correlated with radical changes in knowledge-bases (in 
paradigms). 
Table 3, showing the so called Moore’s law - the steady exponential increase in 
transistor-per-chip and clock speed in microprocessors - is just the most famous examples 
among many others.    
Moreover a rather general property, by now widely acknowledged in the 
innovation literature, is that learning is local and cumulative. "Locality" means that the 
exploration and development of new techniques and product architectures is likely to 
occur in the neighborhood of the techniques and architectures already in use (Atkinson 
and Stiglitz 1969; David 1975; Antonelli 1995). "Cumulativeness" stands for the property 
that current technological developments often build upon past experiences of production 
and innovation, proceed via sequences of specific problem solving junctures (Vincenti 
1990), and in a few circumstances also lead to microeconomic serial correlations in 
successes and failures. This is what Paul David citing Robert Merton citing The New 
Testament calls the Matthew Effect: "For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he 
shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he 
hath" (Merton 1968, p.3). Note that "cumulativeness" at micro level provides robust 
support for those interfirm asymmetries mentioned earlier, while industry-wide, region-
wide and country-wide factors of cumulativeness in learning dynamics are good 
candidates to the explanation of why industries, region and countries tend to 
systematically differ in both technological and economic performances. 
The robustness of notions such as technological trajectories or similar ones is of 
course a primarily empirical question. Come as it may, fundamental issues regard the 
carriers, the fine grained processes and the driving factors underlying the observed 
patterns of technological change. 
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Our discussion so far has primarily focused upon some general features of 
technological knowledge and its revealed techno-economic outcomes (we shall come 
back below to some further properties of knowledge accumulation as such). However, a 
good deal of "economically useful" technological knowledge is nowadays mastered by 
business firms, which even undertake in some countries - such as the USA, Nordic 
European countries, Germany and few others - a small but not negligible portion of the 
effects aimed at a more speculative understandings of physical, chemical, biological 
properties of our world (i.e. they also undertake "basic science")4. How does all that 
relate with the structure and behaviors of firms themselves?        
.QRZOHGJHURXWLQHVDQGFDSDELOLWLHVLQEXVLQHVVRUJDQL]DWLRQV
Possibly one of the most exciting, far from over, intellectual enterprises developed 
over the last decade has involved the interbreeding between the evolutionary economics 
research program, (largely evolutionary inspired) technological innovation studies and an 
emerging competence-/capability-based theory of the firm. The roots rest in the 
pioneering organizational studies by Herbert Simon, James March and colleagues (Simon 
1969; March and Simon 1993; Cyert and March 1992; March 1988) and in the equally 
pioneering explorations of thee nature and economic implications of organizational 
routines by Nelson and Winter (1982) (with the follow-ups such as those discussed in 
Cohen et al(1996); Teece, Pisano and Schuen (1997); Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000); 
Dosi, Coriat and Pavitt (2000); the Special Issue of Industrial and Corporate Change, 
2000, edited by Mie Augier and James March; Montgomery (1995); and Foss and 
Mahnke (2000)). It is familiar enough to most readers (nowadays even to a few 
economists!) that business firms "know how to do certain things" - things like building 
automobiles and computers - and know that with different efficacies and revealed 
performances. In turn, as one discusses in Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000) and Dosi, 
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Coriat and Pavitt (2000) what does "organizational knowledge" mean? What are the 
mechanisms that govern how it is acquired, maintained and sometimes lost? As we 
suggest in the just cited works, organizational knowledge is in fact a fundamental link 
between the social pool of knowledge / skills / discovery opportunities, on the one hand, 
and the rates / direction / economic effectiveness of their exploration / development / 
exploitation on the other. 
Distinctive organizational competences/capabilities5 bear their importance also in 
that they persistently shape the destiny of individual firms - in terms of e.g. profitability, 
growth, probability of survival - and, at least equally important, their distribution across 
firms shapes the patterns of change of broader aggregates such as particular sectors or 
whole countries. 
"Competences" and "capabilities" build on ensembles of organizational routines. 
In turn, the latter (i) as thoroughly argued by Nelson and Winter (1982), embody a good 
part of the memory of the problem-solving repertoires of any one organization: (ii) entail 
complementary mechanisms of governance for potentially conflicting interests (for a 
more detailed discussion see Coriat and Dosi (1988b)), and, (iii) might well involve also 
some "meta-routines", apt to painstakingly assess and possibly challenge and modify 
"lower level" organizational practices (in that, R&D activities as well, often, recurrent 
exercises of "strategic adjustment" are good cases to the point). 
In this view, routines and other recurrent organizational practices may be 
interpreted as a set of problem-solving procedures in turn composed of elementary 
physical acts (such as moving a drawing from an office to another or doing an operation 
on a machine tool) and elementary cognitive acts (such as doing a certain calculation).  
As one argues in Dosi, Hobday, Marengo and Prencipe (2002) it is helpful to 
think of complex problem solving activities as problems of design: the design of 
elaborate artifacts and the design of the processes and organizational structures required 
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to produce them. These processes require the design of complex sequences of moves, 
rules, behaviors and search heuristics typically involving multiple actors. In turns the 
patterns of knowledge decomposition contribute to shape (but are far from identical to) 
the division of labor within and across organization (more in Marengo et al. (2000), 
Teece et al. (1994), Dosi, Hobday and Marengo (2000)).      
The general conjecture of many evolutionary economists is indeed that by 
opening up, together, the "technological blackbox" and the "organizational blackbox" one 
is likely to find robust mappings between the patterns in the collective distributions of 
technological knowledge and the properties of organizational structures and behaviors. 
We shall come back below to some historical examples. Here, in any case, notice a major 
domain of interaction between (evolutionary) economics, organization theory and 
economic sociology - largely waiting to be explored. 
7KH DQDWRP\ RI UHJLPHV RI NQRZOHGJH DFFXPXODWLRQ DQG WKHLU VHFWRUDO
GLPHQVLRQV
Another largely unexplored field of inquiry is the exploration of technology-
specific patterns of knowledge accumulation - of which, an early largely cited prototype 
is Pavitt (1984) - attempting to study the diversity of innovation patterns across industrial 
sectors and identify taxonomies of technological regimes. Such regimes are based on 
industry-specific properties of search for technological improvements and on specific 
natures and sources of knowledge-bases. In line with taxonomic exercise such as Pavitt 
(1984), Patel and Pavitt (1997), Breschi, Malerba and Orsenigo (2000), Marsili (2001) 
the inquiry builds on three basic conjectures, namely that, first, notwithstanding the 
importance of country-wide institutional factors, the properties of innovation processes 
are, to a significant extent, invariant across countries and specific to technologies or 
industrial sectors; second, some general properties of innovation processes shared by 
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populations of firms might be identified independently of a variety of idiosyncratic 
behaviors identifiable at firm-level; and third, diverse regimes entail different 
technological entry barriers, stemming from diverse mode of access to novel 
opportunities by entrants as opposed to (cumulatively learning) incumbents (Marsili 
2001). Again, it could well be at this junction between industrial economics, economic 
sociology, and the sociology of knowledge that one might fruitful address a few of the 
apparent puzzles, briefly mentioned above, concerning the determinants of observed 
industrial structures and their changes. 
,QIRUPDWLRQDQGNQRZOHGJHLQWHFKQRORJ\DQGLQQRYDWLRQ
That there is more to technology and innovation than sheer "information" is not 
likely to be big news to social scientists (except possibly economists!) and practitioners 
alike. 
However, one can go already a long way be rigorously exploring the economic 
properties of information as such (and in any case technological activities involve a rich 
information content). Building on the pioneering works of Simon (1951), Arrow (1962), 
Nelson (1962), Akerlof (1984), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), Radner (1992), Aoki 
(1990) among a few other distinguished authors, it is easy nowadays to acknowledge 
some fundamental economic specificities of "information" as such. 
For example, in many respects similar to that of a "public good" - in many 
economists jargon -, the use of information is 
• non-rival (the fact that one uses it does not prevent the others from using it too); 
• non-excludable (were it not for institutional provisions such as patent-based monopoly 
rights of exploitation). 
Moreover, its generation is subject to:  
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• sunk, upfront, costs of production and basically zero cost of reproduction (in an 
illustrative caricatures, the "cost of production" of Pytagoras Theorem has been fully born 
by Pytagoras himself, while we can infinitely re-use it at our will; near to our concerns 
the same applies to e.g. software); 
• if anything, there are increasing returns to its use, in the sense that the more we use it 
the easier it is, and, dynamically, the higher is the likelihood of learning and producing 
ourselves "better", "novel", in some sense "innovative" further pieces of information.  
As already mentioned far reaching conclusions can be reached by just seriously 
exploring the economic implications of different distributions and processes of generation 
of information. Consider for example the path-breaking works by Masahiko Aoki on the 
properties of different distributions of information in the comparison between 
archetypichal "Japanese" and "American" firms (Aoki 1990). Another example are the 
painstaking investigations of the conditions for the existence of "markets for 
technologies" (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella 2001). 
More generally, note that the very properties of information mentioned above 
most often entail phenomena of market failures (as marginal prices are of no guidance to 
efficient market allocation and equilibria might even fail to exist): see Stiglitz (1994) for 
a through discussion with far reaching interpretative and political implication. 
Having saying that, further insights may be gained by distinguishing between 
sheer information and knowledge. As one discusses at greater length in Dosi, Marengo 
and Fagiolo (1996), the former entails well stated and codified propositions about (i) 
states-of-the world (e.g. "it is raining?"), (ii) property of nature (e.g. "A causes B?"), (iii) 
identities of other agents ("I know Mr. X and he is a crook?") and (iv) explicit algorithm 
on how to do things6. Conversely, knowledge, in the definition we propose here, includes 
(i) cognitive categories; (ii) codes of interpretation of the information itself; (iii) tacit 
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skills, and (iv) search and problem-solving heuristics irreducible to well defined 
algorithms. 
So, for example, the few hundred pages of demonstration of the last Fermat 
theorem would come under the heading of "information". Granted that, only some dozens 
mathematician in the world will have the adequate "knowledge" to understand and 
evaluate it. On the other hand, a chimpanzee, facing those same pages of information 
might just feel like eating them, and the vast majority of humans being would fall 
somewhere in between these two extremes. Similarly a manual on "how to produce 
microprocessors" is "information", while knowledge concerns the pre-existing ability of 
the reader to understand and implement the instruction contained therein.  
Moreover, in this definition, knowledge includes tacit and rather automatic skills 
like operating a particular machine or correctly driving a car to overtake another one 
(without stopping first in order to solve the appropriate system of differential equations!). 
And, finally it includes "visions" and ill-defined rules of search, like those 
involved in most activities of scientific discovery and in technological and organizational 
innovation (e.g. proving a new theorem, designing a new kind of car, figuring out the 
behavioral pattern of a new kind of crook that appeared on financial market?). 
In this definition, knowledge is to varying degree tacit (Polanyi 1966; Nelson and 
Winter 1982) at the very least in the sense that the agent itself, and even a very 
sophisticated observer, would find it very hard to explicitly state the sequence of 
procedures by which information is coded, behavioral patterns are formed, problems are 
solved, etc. Incidentally note also that even in scientific activities tacit knowledge plays 
an important role: as recognized by sociologists like Collins (1974) and Callon (1995), 
the "knowledge" used and diffused cannot be reduced to fully explicit codified statements 
(i.e. information) but involves personal interactions, observation and practical experience 
in specific contexts. 
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On the ground of these distinction, one may look again at the puzzles implied by 
the empirical evidence discussed earlier and ask, with Pavitt, questions like:  
"If knowledge is costless to transmit and re-use why can’t foreigners - who have not paid 
for research - benefit from it (the free rider problem)? If the cost of obtaining foreign produced 
knowledge is negligible, why do many small countries in North-Western Europe perform 
relatively more basic research than the USA itself??Why do firms in science-based industries 
extensively publish the results of their research when, according to the information based view of 
knowledge, they should be appropriating them by keeping them secret or protecting them through 
patents??" (Pavitt 2002, p.7). 
We fully share also Pavitt’s answer: the apparent anomalies melt away if one 
acknowledges the tacit aspect of knowledge, intimately complementary to codified 
information, person- or organization-embodied, and rather sticky in its transmission 
(Pavitt 2002). 
Not all the analysts of technology however share this view. A few scholars argue 
indeed that the notion of tacitness has been overrated and that the "degrees of tacitness" 
ultimately depend upon the cost and benefits involved in the process of articulating and 
codifying knowledge rather than upon some intrinsic properties of knowledge itself (see 
Cowan, David and Foray (2000) and the whole special issues of Industrial and Corporate 
Change (2000) edited by Cohendet and Steinmuller, devoted to the subject). The 
question, in this alternative view, ultimately boils down to a matter of incentives and 
availability of new technologies - today, in primis, information and communication 
technologies (ICT) -  apt to facilitate the codification job.  
Here of course we are far from denying that a massive process of knowledge 
codification is in progress, indeed fostered by ICT’s and reaching domains previously 
ruled by tacitness - from artifacts design to a few control and production activities 
previously unaffected by forms of electromechanical automation (Balconi 1998). 
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However, we maintain, tacit features of knowledge continue to be an intrinsic part of 
technical change and they are also essential to the very process of codification and to the 
attribution of meaning to information itself.  Moreover we suggest, quite irrespectively of 
any incentive, the nature of specific knowledge bases deeply influence the degrees of 
difficulty in codification (or indeed its sheer impossibility: for example it can be formally 
proved that no codified process can be established ex ante in order to prove yet 
undemonstrated theorems; by the same token in the technological domain it is hard to 
think of a codified process able to develop what we do not know yet?). Together, our 
general conjecture here is that the diverse degrees to which knowledge bases can be 
easily codified contributes to explain also the "uneven development of human know-
how"7 in different fields. 
7KHWDQJOHGUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQVFLHQFHVDQGWHFKQRORJLHV
There is little question that science plays a crucial role in opening up new 
possibilities of major technological advances. The linkages between science and 
technology have been tight ever since the rise of modern science8 but, especially in this 
century, the emergence of major new technological paradigms has frequently been 
directly linked with major scientific breakthroughs. Until the end of the nineteenth 
century, technological innovations were typically introduced by imaginative craftsmen - 
typical examples being the development of engines by practical-minded inventors well 
before the works of Carnot on thermodynamics or the invention of  the chronograph for 
measuring longitude by the watchmaker John Harrison in 1730 against the opinion of the 
astronomers including Halley (Sobel 1996). Conversely, in this century, as far as major 
innovations are concerned, one moves closer to a science-based model of technological 
innovation. Important instances in this respect are the origin of synthetic chemistry 
(Freeman 1982) and the transistor (Nelson 1962; H. S. Kleiman 1977; Dosi 1984). For 
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example, in the latter case the discovery of certain quantum mechanics properties of 
semiconductors, yielding a Nobel Prize for physics, and the technological development of 
the first microelectronics device have been one and the same thing (Nelson 1962;  Braun 
and  MacDonald 1978; Dosi 1984). In more recent years, one finds many further 
examples, the extreme one being probably biotechnology and more generally life-
sciences (Orsenigo 1988; Hendersonet al 1999). Other instances, include computational 
chemistry and  speech-recognition (Koumpis and Pavitt 1999, Mahdi and Pavitt  1997), 
just to name a few.  
The increasing role of scientific knowledge in technological advances as gone 
together with major changes in the overall organization of innovative activities.  
The conventional way of representing the impact of science on technological 
innovation has been often captured by some version of the (improperly called!) "Arrow- 
Nelson model" (Arrow 1962; Nelson 1959 and 1982; see also David, Mowery and 
Steinmueller (1992)), whereby (exogenously determined) science provides the pool of 
notional opportunities upon which industrial R&D, and more generally "technologically 
useful" knowledge, draws. 
It is indeed a useful first approximation, but we cannot stop there and must 
thereafter acknowledge that the relationship between science and technology goes both 
ways. As discussed in Rosenberg (1982) and (1994), Freeman and Soete (1997), Pavitt 
(1999), Brooks (1994), factors of influence of scientific knowledge on technology 
include: 
• of course, the knowledge new "properties of nature" upon which technologies can build 
upon; 
• the development of new design tools and instruments initially aimed at scientific 
research which are thereafter applied to commercial uses - examples among many being 
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the Scanning Electron microscope, the laser and many others (Rosenberg 1990; Brooks 
1994). 
• Training of applied researchers mastering state-of-the-art scientific knowledge. 
Conversely, technology has contributed to science: 
• as a source of new scientific challenges (Brooks 1994); 
• with new instrumentation and measurement technologies needed to address novel 
scientific question more efficiently. 
Indeed the accumulation of technical knowledge has provided for centuries a base of 
observations that subsequently stimulated and focussed scientific research (see Rosenberg 
(1982) for a thorough discussion)9. 
Similarly, the development of instrumentation has exerted a major impact on 
subsequent scientific progress: just think of the microscope, the telescope, x-ray 
crystallography and obviously the computer. More generally, the allocation of resources 
to specific scientific fields is often strongly influenced by prior expectations on 
technological payoffs as well as by the nature and the interests of the "bridging 
institutions"10  that are instrumental in applying theoretical advances to the development 
of practical devices even under remote or nonexistent direct economic incentives (this is 
the case of public agencies like the military11). 
 Incidentally note also that in recent years, the increased closeness of scientific 
research and technological innovation in fields like biotechnology and information 
technology, jointly with an increasing involvement of scientific institutions in 
commercial activities is leading to the concern that scientific research runs the risk of 
becoming too dependent and hostage of immediate and direct economic interests, thereby 
compromising the ethos of science that has proved so beneficial to the society and the 
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economy (Dasgupta and David 1994; Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998).  We shall briefly 
come back to this issue below. 
In most contemporary developed economies, one typically observes quite a few 
institutions, together with a multitude of profit-seeking firms, sharing in different 
combinations the tasks of scientific explorations and search for would-be technological 
applications12. However the relevance of scientific knowledge and the mechanisms 
through which such knowledge is transmitted vary greatly across scientific disciplines, 
technologies and industries (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). Various studies (Mansfield 
1991; Jaffee 1989; Jaffee, Trajitenberg and Henderson 1993; Audretsch and Feldman 
1996; Klevorick et al. 1995) have shown that science is directly relevant to industrial 
R&D only in a small number of industries - typically, agriculture, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, electronics, precision instruments).  Some scientific disciplines - like 
mathematics and physics - are relevant for an very large variety of industries, but mostly 
in an indirect way. Others - e.g. biology - have a more immediate practical impact, which 
is however concentrated in a small spectrum of industries. In general, however, the 
evidence seems to support the notion that science is indeed a crucial component of 
industrial innovation as an ingredient that increases the "general and generic" ability to 
solve complex technical problems (Mansfield 1991; Klevorick et al. 1995).  
Historically, the contemporary symbiotic relationship between activities of 
scientific and technological came about through two converging processes. A first one 
involved the progressive incorporation of R&D activities within business firms, 
beginning in the late 19th centuries in few countries - like Germany, Switzerland, and a 
bit later the USA - and few sectors - notably chemicals and heavy electrical engineering. 
Along with the institutionalization of industrial R&D within "Chandlerian" firms, second, 
the institutionalization of academic research proceeded too, albeit at a very different pace 
and with large differences across countries. 
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In the USA, as Rosenberg and Nelson (1994) have pointed out, before War Word 
II, the linkages between academic and industrial research were frequent but not always 
systematically organized. Despite some debate among historians, it is usually recognized 
that the quality of American academic science was by and large lagging behind Europe, 
with some important exceptions like chemistry and biology (Cohen 1976; Thackray 1982, 
Mowery and Rosenberg 1998). However,  universities developed quickly relatively 
strong interactions with industry, especially at the local level in response to practical 
concerns and  particularly in practically oriented disciplines - like engineering, medicine, 
agricultural sciences, etc.. Until World War II, this was actually the main function that - 
jointly with teaching - universities performed in favor of business firms. Similarly, 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1998) have argued that the contributions of American 
University research to economic growth were not only the product of a few elite 
universities, but involved many universities, many of them providing local service to 
local industry and agriculture. 
 The explosive growth of investment in scientific research - mainly coming from 
public sources and mainly directed to universities and other public research institutions - 
marks a distinct feature of the economic development of most industrial countries in the 
post War World II era. And it also marks the quick emergence of a long lasting American 
leadership regarding both quite a few scientific disciplines and most "frontier" 
technologies.  
In a nutshell, all developed contemporary economies - notwithstanding important 
national specificities - share mechanisms of generation and exploitation of innovative 
opportunities involving the interaction between: 
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• The continuous accumulation of scientific knowledge (to a good extent exogenous to 
business firms, but not entirely: to repeat, firms do undertake a significant amount of 
basic research (Rosenberg 1990; Pavitt 1991). 
• Multiple learning process endogenous to individual firms and networks of them 
entailing: (i) formal R&D activity, but also more informal processes of (ii) learning from 
design, production and marketing; (iii) learning-by-interacting with customers and 
suppliers. 
As already mentioned the balance between these diverse learning procedures vary 
across technologies and industrial sectors highlighting a variegated "anatomy" of the 
capitalistic innovation engine13. 
Having saying that, crucial issues regard the underlying forces driving 
technological accumulation throughout such a system and in particular the role of 
economic and social factors. 
      
(FRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOIDFWRUVLQWKHHPHUJHQFHRIQHZSDUDGLJPV
It is useful to separate the genesis of new paradigms from the processes leading to 
the dominance of some of them. Let us first consider the emergence of new potential 
paradigms; that is generation of notional opportunities of radical innovations involving 
new knowledge bases, new search heuristics, new dominant designs. 
Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that one will not be able to find anything 
like a general theory of the emergence of new technological paradigms. However, what 
might be possible is a) an analysis of the necessary conditions for such emergence; b) 
historical taxonomies and also appreciative models of the processes by which it occurs; 
and c) taxonomies and models of the processes of competition amongst different 
paradigms and their diffusions. 
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Regarding the first heading, one is like to find that the existence of some 
unexploited technological opportunities, together with the relevant knowledge base and 
some minimal appropriability conditions, define only the boundaries of the set of 
potential new paradigms: those which are actually explored within this set might crucially 
depend on particular organizational and social dynamics. So for example there is good 
evidence that the microelectronic paradigm as we know it (silicon-based, etc.) was 
shaped in its early stages by military requirements (Dosi 1984; Misa 1985). David Noble 
(1984) argues that the NC machine-tools paradigm - although he does not use that 
expression - has been influenced by power consideration regarding labor management. In 
the history of technologies one finds several examples of this kind. The general point is 
that various institutions (ranging from incumbent firms to government agencies), social 
groups and also individual agents (including of course individual inventors and 
entrepreneurs) perform as ex ante selectors of the avenues of research that are pursued, 
the techno-economic dimensions upon which research ought to focus, the knowledge 
base one calls upon. Thus, they ultimately select the new paradigms that are actually 
explored. 
 Conversely, there is a much more general theoretical story regarding the 
development, diffusion and competition among those (possible alternative) paradigms 
that are actually explored. It can be told via explicit evolutionary models (as in Nelson 
and Winter (1982) or in Silverberg, Dosi and Orsenigo (1988)), via path-dependent 
stochastic models (as in Arthur (1988), Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski (1987), Dosi and 
Kaniovski (1994)), and also via sociological models of network development (as in 
Callon (1991)). The basic ingredients of the story are (i) some forms of dynamics 
increasing returns (for example in learning); (ii) positive externalities in the production or 
the use if technology; (iii) endogenous expectation formation; (iv) some market dynamics 
which selects ex  post amongst products, and indirectly amongst technologies and firms; 
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(v) the progressive development of standards and relatively inertial institutions which 
embody and reproduce particular forms of knowledge and also the behavioral norms and 
incentives to do so. 
(FRQRPLF,QIOXHQFHVXSRQWKHSDWWHUQVRIWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHV
Economic factors do influence also the rates and direction of "normal" technical 
change although within some boundaries set by the nature of each paradigm. The story 
we propose runs as follows. 
Each body of knowledge specific to particular technologies determines in the 
short term the notional opportunities of "normal" technical advance and also the scope of 
possible variation in input coefficients, production processes and characteristics of the 
artifacts in response to changing economic conditions. So, for example the 
semiconductor-based paradigm in microelectronics or the oil-based paradigm in organic 
chemistry broadly shape the scope and directions of technical progress - i.e. the 
"trajectories" - in both product and process technologies (for example, miniaturization 
and increasing chip density in semiconductors, polymerization techniques in organic 
chemicals, etc.). In turn, inducement effects can work basically in four ways, operating 
through (i) changes in search/problem solving heuristics induced by relative prices 
change and supply/demand conditions; (ii) effects of demand patterns upon the allocation 
of search efforts across diverse production activities; (iii) the effects of appropriability 
conditions, again, upon search efforts; and (iv) selection dynamics weeding-out ever-
changing "populations" of technologies, artifacts, behavioral traits and firms. 
Search Heuristics. 
Changes in relative price and demand or supply condition may affect search heuristics, 
acting as Rosenberg (1976) puts it, as focusing devices: historical illustrations are quite a 
few cases of supply shocks and technological bottlenecks, from the continental blockade 
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during Napoleon wars to technical imbalances in the late nineteenth century history of 
mechanical technologies. 
Output Growth and Search Efforts. 
"Inducement" may take the form of an influence of market conditions upon the relative 
allocation of search efforts to different technologies or products. In the literature, it has 
come to be known as the "Schmookler’s hypothesis" (Schmookler 1966), suggesting that 
cross-product differences in the rates of innovation (as measured by patenting) could be 
explained by differences in the relative rates of growth of demand. Note that, in this 
respect, while there is no a priori reason why the perception of demand opportunities 
should not influence the relative allocation of technology efforts, the general idea of 
"demand-led" innovation has been criticized at its foundations for its theoretical 
ambiguities (does one talk about observed demand? or expected demand? and how are 
these expectations formed?) (Mowery and Rosenberg 1979). Moreover, the empirical 
evidence is mixed. The review in Freeman (1994, p.480) concludes that "the majority of 
innovations characterized as "demand-led"?were actually relatively minor innovation 
along established trajectories" while as shown by Walsh (1984) and Fleck (1988), 
"counter-Schmookler-type patterns was the characteristic of the early stages of innovation 
in synthetic materials, drugs, dyestuffs.." and robotics (Freeman 1984, p.480). 
As emphasized by Freeman himself and by Kline and Rosenberg (1986), the 
major step forward here is the abandonment of any ’linear’ model of innovation (no matter 
wether driven by demand or technological shocks) and the acknowledgment of a co-
evolutionary view embodying persistent feedback loops between innovation, diffusion 
and endogenous generation of further opportunities of advancement. 
Appropriability and Rates of Innovation. 
The properties of innovation and knowledge discussed above also entail a fundamental 
tradeoff powerfully highlighted by Schumpeter (and earlier Marx). Were technological 
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advances (or for that matter technological knowledge) a sheer public good, no incentive 
would be there for profit-seeking agents to strive for it. Conversely, some expected 
appropriation of some economic benefit from successful technological implies also 
systematic departures from the mythical "pure competition" yardstick of which 
economists are so fond  of. 
In fact, a few appropriability devices are often at work in contemporary 
economies including (a) patents, (b) secrecy, (c) lead times, (d) costs and time required 
for duplication, (e) learning-curve effects, (f) superior sales and service efforts. To these 
one should add more obvious forms of appropriation of differential technical efficiency 
related to scale economies and more generally the control of complementary assets and 
technologies, that are not directly ingredients of the innovation, but allow inventors to 
extract the profits from it (Teece 1986)14. 
In an extreme synthesis, Levin et al. (1985, p. 33) find that for most industries, 
’’lead times and learning curve advantages, combined with complementary marketing 
efforts, appear to be the principle mechanisms of appropriating returns for product 
innovations". Learning curves, secrecy and lead times are also the major appropriation 
mechanisms for process innovations. Patenting often appears to be a complementary 
mechanism which, however, does not seem to be the central one, with some exceptions 
(e. g., chemicals and pharmaceutical products). Moreover, by comparing the protection of 
processes and products, one tends to observe that lead times and learning curves are 
relatively more effective ways of protecting process innovations, while patents are a 
relatively better protection for product innovations.  
Moreover, there appears to be quite significant interindustrial variance in the 
importance of the various ways of protecting innovations and in the overall degrees of 
appropriability: Some three-quarters of the industries surveyed by the study reported the 
existence of at least one effective means of protecting process innovation, and more than 
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90 percent of’ the industries reported the same regarding product innovations (Levin et al. 
1985, p. 20; these results have been confirmed by a series of other subsequent studies 
conducted for other countries (see for example the PACE study for the European Union 
(Arundel, van de Paal and Soete 1995), suggesting that appropriability conditions are 
rather similar across advanced industrialized countries). 
Granted that, highly controversial issues concern the relation between degrees of 
appropriability, above some minimal threshold, and search efforts by private self-seeking 
agents. Do innovative efforts grow monotonically in the expectations of rents stemming 
from would-be innovation? And, more specifically, what is the influence of different 
patenting regimes and other forms of enforcement of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) 
upon innovation rates? 
One cannot review here a rapidly growing literature whose striking bottom line is 
however the very little evidence supporting the (misplaced) common wisdom that tighter 
appropriability regimes unambiguously foster innovative activities. 
Historical examples, such as those quoted by Merges and Nelson (1994) on the 
Selden patent around the use of a light gasoline in an internal combustion engine to 
power an automobile or the Wright brothers patent on an efficient stabilizing and steering 
system for flying machines, are good cases to the point, showing how the how the IPR 
regime probably slowed down considerably the subsequent development of automobiles 
and aircrafts, due to the time and resources consumed by lawsuits against the patents 
themselves. The current debate on property rights in biotechnology suggests similar 
problems, whereby granting very broad claims on patents might have a detrimental effect 
on the rate of technical change, insofar as they preclude the exploration of alternative 
applications of the patented invention. This is particularly the case when inventions 
concerning fundamental techniques or knowledge are concerned, e.g. genes or the Leder 
and Stewart patent on the achievement of a genetically engineered mouse that develops 
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cancer. This is clearly a fundamental research tool. To the extent that such techniques and 
knowledge are critical for further research that proceeds cumulatively on the basis of the 
original invention, the attribution of broad property rights might severely hamper further 
developments. Even more so, if the patent protects non only the product the inventors 
have achieved (the "onco-mouse") but all the class of products that could be produced 
through that principle, i.e. "all transgenic non-human mammals", or all the possible uses 
of a patented invention (say, a gene sequence), even though they are not named in the 
application15. 
A further set of problems is exemplified by the celebrated anti-commons tragedy 
raised by Heller and Eisenberg (1998): while in the commons problem the lack of 
proprietary rights is argued to lead to over-utilization and depletion of common goods, in 
biotechnology the risk may be that excessive fragmentation of IPRs among too many 
owners can slow down research activities because each owner can block each other. (At a 
more theoretical level, see the insightful discussion by Winter (1993) showing how tight 
appropriability regimes in evolutionary environments might deter technical progress).  
Economic Factors Shaping Selection Process 
Evolutionary economists share with evolutionary epistemologists and a few historians of 
technologies (David, 1975 (putting the past?); Mokyr (2000), Vincenti (1990), Nelson 
(2003), among others) the view that it is the coupling between some variety-generating 
mechanism and some selection process that drive technological change. Having saying 
that, more controversial issues regard (a) the unit of selection, (b) the nature of selection 
process, and, (c) the criteria driving selection itself. 
Concerning the unit of selection, good candidates are: 
• technological paradigms and, at a smaller scale, specific technologies and pieces of 
knowledge; 
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• artifacts; 
• organizational routines; 
• firms; 
Note that they are not at all mutually exclusive. On the contrary it is plausible to 
think of diverse processes of selection partially nested into each other and possibly 
occurring at different time scale. So for example, products markets typically select upon 
artifacts, affecting only indirectly - via rewards/penalties in terms of profits and markets 
shares - the selection amongst firms. Financial markets, on the contrary, typically operate 
upon firms as such. In turn, direct or indirect processes of firm selection ultimately 
involve a selection among routines and among technologies, in so far as firms are their 
specific carriers. Moreover, techniques and paradigms also undergo, so to speak "ex-
ante" selection processes within firms, communities of practitioners, technical 
association, universities, etc. involving more explicit, even if still mistake-ridden, 
deliberative procedures. Illustrative examples are Vincenti’s story on aircraft design 
(Vincenti 1990) and Warglien’s account of the hierarchically nested process of project 
selection within a microelectronic firm (Warglien 2000).  
Incidentally, note in this respect that paradigms and dominant designs act at the 
same time as sources of variation-generation and also of "blindness-reduction" in the 
generation process itself, without however taking away the intrinsic "stochastic element 
in what is actually produced, chosen and put to test of use" (Ziman 2000, p.6). 
Economic criteria clearly shape, in different ways, the selection criteria of all the 
foregoing processes. For example, prices and users’ revealed preferences 
straightforwardly influence selection over population of artifacts and so do profitabilities 
with respect to financial allocation mechanism across firm. And, indirectly, economic 
influence inform also "ex ante" selection mechanism via the interests and the 
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expectations of all economic actors when "choosing" to explore particular venues of 
search, particular artifact design, particular problem solving procedures and not others. 
But what about strictly social factors? How do they influence the rates and 
direction of technical change? 
7KH6FRSHDQG%RXQGVRI6RFLDO6KDSLQJRI7HFKQRORJ\
It should be abundantly clear from the foregoing discussion that in our 
interpretation diverse social and political forces play a crucial role, first, in the dynamic 
of selection amongst would-be paradigms, and, second, in the shaping of the actual 
trajectories explored within each paradigm. If anything, even such a distinction is 
somewhat artificial: as Constant (1980) and (1987) shows, just with a slightly different 
language, paradigms and trajectories emerge together with (i) a technological community, 
(ii) corporate organizations carriers of such knowledge, and (iii) related technological 
systems. We have briefly mentioned the co-evolutionary processes linking the dynamics 
of knowledge, on the one hand, and the dynamics of business organization seen as 
repositories of problem solving routines, on the other. Yet another, complementary, 
representation would be in terms of the emergence and establishment of professional 
communities and related institutions (e.g. the communities of chemicals engineers, their 
journals, professional societies, university departments, etc.), intimately linked with a 
broadly shared body of knowledge and practices. 
In our view, there is indeed little doubt on the importance of the social shaping of 
technology, as MacKenzie and Wajcman (1995) put it (see also Rip, Misa and Schot 
(1995)). However important controversies concern  (i) the bounds which the nature of 
specific technical problems and of specific bodies of knowledge put upon the reach of 
"battling competing interests and more or less effective campaigns to capture the hearts 
and minds of (different constituencies)" (Nelson 2003, p.514), and (ii) the degrees of 
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"social re-negotiability" of whatever incumbent technological system (i.e. its lack of path 
dependency).  
A rich and diverse literature, stemming primarily from the sociology of science 
and technology tackles this issues (see Bijker et al. (1997), and the thorough review in 
Williams and Edge (1996)). It is impossible to discuss here this line of studies. Let us just 
admit that we often find many contributions in this vein a bit too near the second extreme 
of a continuum having on one side naive forms of "technological determinism" (i.e. 
search and exploration is always about finding objectively better solution to old and new 
technical problems) and, on the other, radical forms of social constructivism (whereby, in 
a caricature, with good bargaining skills even gravitation laws my be renegotiated with 
nature). 
A somewhat complementary debate regards possible constraints (or lack of them) 
posed by specific technological paradigms upon the feasible forms of organization of 
production. For example an hypothesis on the emergence of the modern factory system of 
production is that it has been powerfully fostered by the associated efficiency 
improvement stemming from (i) the exploitation of inanimate source of energy; (ii) an 
increasing division of labor, and, together, (iii) more refined mechanisms of control upon 
the workforce and more favorable patterns of appropriation of the social products by the 
capitalist class. An alternatively hypotheses is, conversely, that only the latter set of 
factors was at work - the obvious normative implication being that an alternative 
organizational history could have been and could be easily imagined, subject to the 
collective will of social actors. For a revealing exchange on these questions, see Marglin 
(1974), Sabel and Zeitlin (1985), Landes (1986) and (1987).  
Similar issues emerge with regard to the efficiency properties of "flexible 
specialization" as a possible general alternative to mass production (Piore and Sabel 
(1984), Sabel and Zeitlin (1995). 
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While it is impossible to enter the debate here, just notice that to a good extent the 
bottom line ha to do with degrees of plasticity of technological knowledge. Radical 
versions of both "economic inducement" and "social construction" theories imply highly 
malleable features of technologies: "money can buy everything" - in the former -, and 
"society can bargain everything" - in the latter.  
Our view is much more cautious, and while fully acknowledging the profound 
reciprocal influences between technological, economic and social factors, maintain that 
the process of accumulation of technological knowledge entails an inner logic and inner 
constraints which social or economic drivers can hardly overcome at least in the short-
term. A co-evolutionary perspective indeed implies a painstaking identification of the 
subtle intertwining between "windows of opportunity" for social action, on the one hand, 
and binding constraints inherited from history and/or from available technologies, on the 
other.           
               
7HFKQRHFRQRPLF SDUDGLJPV IURP PLFUR WHFKQRORJLHV WR QDWLRQDO
V\VWHPVRILQQRYDWLRQ
 So far, we have discussed paradigms, trajectories or equivalent concepts mainly 
at micro-technological level. A paradigm-based theory of innovation and production - we 
have argued - seems to be highly consistent with the evidence on the patterned and 
cumulative nature of technical change and also with the evidence on micro economic 
heterogeneity and technological gaps. Moreover it directly links with those theories of 
production in economics which allow for dynamic increasing returns (from A. Young and 
Kaldor to recent and more rigorous formalized on path-dependent models of innovation 
diffusion), whereby the interaction between micro decisions and some forms of learning 
or some externalities produces irreversible technological paths and lock-in effects with 
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respect to technologies which may well be inferior, on any measure, to other notional 
ones, but still happen to be dominant - loosely speaking - because of their weight of their 
history (Arthur 1989; David 1985; Dosi and Bassanini 2001). 
The upside of the same story is that a world of knowledge-driven increasing 
returns is much less bleak that conventional economic theory has been preaching: there 
always are (partly) "free lunches", offered by ever-emerging opportunities for 
technological, organizational and institutional innovation. However, there is nothing 
automatic in the economic fulfillment of the notional promises offered by persistent and 
widespread learning process. Indeed the fulfillment of such promise ultimately depends 
upon matching/mismatching patterns between technological knowledge, the structure and 
behaviors of business organizations and broader institutional set-ups.    
The steps leading from a microeconomic theory of innovation and production to 
more aggregate analyses are clearly numerous and complex. A first obvious question 
concern the possibility of identifying relatively coherent structure and dynamics also at 
broader levels of observation. Indeed, historians of technology - T. Hughes, B. Gilles and 
P. David, among others - highlight the importance of technological systems, that is in the 
terminology of this paper, structured combination of micro technological paradigms: see 
for example the fascinating reconstruction of the emerging system of electrification and 
electrical standards in David (1991), taken as an insightful guidance also for 
contemporary diffusion of ICT systems. One of the messages is that "retardation factors" 
in the economic realization of the promise are ubiquitous and they also recurrently 
explain what contemporaries in various epochs might have identified as an apparent 
"productivity paradox" - the puzzle emphasized by Robert Solow more than a decade ago 
- according to which computers show up everywhere but in statistics on productivity. As 
David points out also "in 1900 contemporaries might well have said that electric dynamos 
were to be seen ’everywhere but in the economic statistics’" (David 1991, p.315). The 
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bottom line is that the lag is associated with the requirements of incremental 
improvements, organizational adaptation and ultimately "the path dependent nature of the 
process of transition between one techno-economic regime to the next" (David 1991, 
p.315).   
 At an even higher level of generality, Freeman and Perez (1988), Freeman and 
Louça (2001) and Perez (2002) have used the notion of techno-economic paradigms as a 
synthetic definition of macro-level system of production, innovation, political governance 
and social relations. So, for example, they identify broad phases of modern industrial 
development partly isomorphic to the notion of "regimes of socio-economic 'Regulation'" 
suggested by the manly French macro institutionalist literature (Aglietta 1976; Boyer 
1988a, 1988b; see also Coriat and Dosi (1998a)). 
 In an extreme synthesis, both prospectives hold, first, that one can identify rather 
long periods of capitalist development distinguished according to their specific engines of 
technological dynamism and their modes of governance of the relationships amongst the 
major social actors (e.g. firms, workers, banks, collective political authorities, etc.) and, 
second, that the patterns of technological advancement and those of institutional changes 
are bound to be coupled in such ways as to yield recognizable invariances for quite long 
times in most economic and political structures. Just to provide an example, one might 
roughly identify, over the three decades after World War II, across most develops 
economies, some "Fordist/Keynesian" regime of socio-economic "Regulation", driven by 
major innovative opportunities of technological innovation in electromechanical 
technologies, synthetic chemistry, forms of institutional governance of industrial conflict, 
income distribution and aggregate demand management. Analogously, earlier in 
industrial history, one should be able to detect some sort of archetype of a 
"classical/Victorian Regime" driven in its growth by the full exploitation of textile 
manufacturing and light engineering mechanization, relatively competitive labor markets, 
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politically driven effort to expand privileged market outlets, etc. (more on this in Coriat 
and Dosi (1998a). 
 These general conjectures on historical phases or regimes are grounded on the 
importance in growth and development of specific combinations among technological 
systems and forms of socio-economic governance. Figure 3, from Perez (2002) provides 
a suggestive taxonomy.  
 A complementary, somewhat more "cross-sectional", exercise concern the 
identification of national socio- economic regimes with distinctive embedding 
mechanisms of technological learning within national systems of innovation, production 
and governance. 
 So, even if micro paradigms present considerable invariances across countries, 
the ways they are combined in broader national systems of innovation display - we 
suggest - a considerable variety, shaped by county-specific institutions, policies and 
social factors. The hypothesis here is that evolutionary microfoundation are a fruitful 
starting point for a theory showing how technological gaps and national institutional 
diversities can jointly reproduce themselves over rather long spans of time in ways that 
are easily compatible with the patterns of incentives and opportunities facing individual 
agents, even when they might turn out to be profoundly suboptimal from a collective 
point of view. 
At this level of analyses, inquires like those undertaken in different veins by 
Soskice (1997), Boyer and Hollingsworth (1997), Hall and Soskice (2001), Crouch and 
Streek (1997), Lazonick (2002), Dore (2000), starts where this chapter ends, addressing a 
few of the macro condition making up for diverse types of relatively coherent 
institutional combinatorics (e.g. underlying "Anglo-Saxon" vs. "Corporatist" system of 
innovation and production, etc.). 
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At this juncture, economic sociology, again, is bound to play a fundamental role, 
highlighting the social embedding of technological learning and its exploitation at work. 
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Table 1 - Major inventions, Discoveries and Innovations by Country (percentage of total) 
 
 
3HULRG 7RWDO %ULWDLQ )UDQFH *HUPDQ\ 86$ 2WKHUV
  
30 46.7 16.7 3.3 10.0 23.3 
  	
68 42,6 32.4 5.9 13.2 5.9 
 	
  
95 44.2 22.1 10.5 12.6 10.5 
 	 
129 28.7 22.5 17.8 22.5 8.5 
 	
  
163 17.8 20.9 23.9 25.2 12.3 
 	 
204 14.2 17.2 19.1 37.7 11.8 
 
  
139 13.7 9.4 15.1 52.5 9.4 
  
113 11.5 0.9 12.4 61.9 13.3 
 
Source: Dosi et  al. (1990). 
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Table 2 - Patents Granted in the USA by Country of Origin, 1883-1986 (as a percentage of all 
foreign patenting). 
 
 
        
$XVWUDOLD 1,11 2,33 1,96 0,6 0,92 1,14 1,01 1,00 1,02
$XVWULD 2,62 3,36 2,47 1,12 1,02 1,09 0,91 0,74 0,69
%HOJLXP 1,59 1,35 1,3 1,14 1,23 0,74 0,73 0,87 0,93
&DQDGD 19,94 10,54 10,25 7,99 6,2 4,01 4,33 4,61 4,64
'HQPDUN 0,56 0,46 0,71 0,74 0,7 0,56 0,37 0,44 0,70
)UDQFH 14,22 9,79 9,76 10,36 9,38 7,22 6,67 6,18 5,49
*HUPDQ\ 18,67 30,72 32,36 25,6 24,25 20,8 17,72 14,45 13,42
,WDO\ 0,24 0,92 1,19 3,02 3,39 3,05 2,93 2,36 2,14
-DSDQ 0,16 0,03 1,4 1,93 22,1 40,35 45,43 47,64 44,70
1HWKHUODQGV 0,24 0,75 1,57 5,71 3,03 2,2 2,23 1,75 1,79
1RUZD\ 0,32 0,49 0,71 0,61 0,42 0,25 0,26 0,28 0,32
6ZHGHQ 0,95 1,32 3,19 4,64 3,4 2,7 1,79 1,76 2,01
6ZLW]HUODQG 1,75 2,27 4,46 8,8 5,79 3,7 2,99 2,31 1,84
8QLWHG.LQJGRP 34,55 30,52 22,23 23,45 12,56 7,37 6,49 5,42 5,13
(DVWHUQ(XURSH
                  
LQFOXGLQJ5XVVLD 0,40 1,49 1,62 0,55 2,53 1,13 0,35 0,26 0,29
1,&
V 0,4 1,12 1,03 1,31 1,36 1,5 3,19 7,33 12,09
2WKHUV 3,28 2,54 3,07 2,43 1,72 2,19 2,61 2,59 2,79
 
 
Source: elaboration on Dosi et al. (1990) and National Science Board 2000. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Source: National Science Board 2000. 
  
42 
 
Figure 2 - Density Distribution of Labor Productivity (Normalized) in four Sectors of Italian 
Manufacturing: Machines tools, Pharmaceuticals, Metals, Textiles. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Bottazzi, Cefis, Dosi and Secchi 2002 
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Table 3 - Moore’s Law: The trend in the number of transistors per chip over time 
 
Microprocessor Year Transistors (8000S) Clock Speed 
(MHz) 
4004 1971 2.3 0.1 
8008 1972 3.5 0.2 
8080 1974 6.0 2.0 
8086 1978 29.0 10.0 
80286 1982 134.0 12.5 
Intel 386 1985 275.0 16.0 
Intel 486 1989 1200.0 25.0 
Pentium 1993 3100.0 60.0 
Pentium Pro 1995 5500.0 200.0 
Pentium II 1997 7500.0 300.0 
Pentium III 1999 9500.0 600.0 
 
Source: National Science Board 2000 
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Figure 3
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1
 Interpretations of technical change and a number of historical examples can be found in Freeman (1994),Rosenberg 
(1994), Nelson and Winter (1982), Hughes (1983), David (1975), Mokyr (1990), Saviotti (1996), Pavitt (1999), Dosi 
(1984), Basalla (1988), Constant (1980), Ziman (2000), among others; see for partial surveys Dosi (1988) and Freeman 
(1994).     
2
 Incidentally note that the notion of dominant design is well in tune with the general idea technological paradigms but the 
latter do not necessarily imply the former. A revealing case to the point are pharmaceuticals technologies which do 
involve specific knowledge basis, specific search heuristics, etc. - i.e. the strong mark of paradigms - without however 
any hint at dominant design. Molecules, even when aimed at the same pathology, might have quite different structures: in 
that space, one is unlikely to find similarities akin those linking even a Volkswagen Beetle 1937 and a Ferrari 2000. Still, 
the notion of "paradigm" holds in terms of underlying features of knowledge bases and search processes.       
3
 This is akin to the notion of reverse salient (Huges, 1983) and technological bottlenecks (Rosenberg, 1976): to illustrate, 
think of increasing the speed of a machine tool, which in turn demands changes in cutting materials, which leads to 
changes in other parts of the machine?     
4
 See Pavitt (1991), Rosenberg (1990). 
5
 In the literature, which admittedly includes some of the authors of this work, the two terms have been used quite 
liberally and interchangeably. In the introduction to Dosi, Nelson and Winter and more explicitly in Dosi, Coriat and 
Pavitt (2000) one proposes that the notion of capability ought to confined to relatively purposeful, "high level" tasks such 
as e.g. "building an automobile" with certain characteristics, while "competences", for sake of clarity might be confined 
to the ability to master specific knowledge bases (e.g. "mechanical" or "organic chemistry" competences). Clearly, such 
notion of competences/capabilities largely overlap with what has come to be known as the "competence view of the firm" 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000) attempt to offer also some refinements within a rather 
germane perspective.          
6
 These four sets correspond quite closely to the codified aspects of Lundvall’s taxonomy, distinguishing know-what, 
know-why. know-who and know-how (Lundvall, 1995). 
7
 This is also the title of an important research, in -progress, coordinated by Richard Nelson; for preliminary results, see 
Nelson (2001) and Nelson and Nelson (2002). 
8
 The debate among historians about the role of science - or, to put it differently - of a positive attitude towards the 
rational manipulation of the environment and the rational adaptation of means to ends - for the emergence of the 
Industrial Revolution the  is highly relevant in this context. See Landes (1968), Needham, (1954); Musson and Robinson 
(1969), among others. Of course, a general underlying issue regards "what is science" as distinguished from "what is 
technology". It is an issue that we cannot handle here. For our purposes suffice to recall the traditional and noble view 
shared by epistemologists as divers as Kuhn and Popper, pointing at the distinctions of science in terms of the procedures 
of discovery, validation and falsification and to somewhat overlapping distinction put forward by students of technology 
such as Vincenti (1990) based on different purposes of science, aiming at the understanding of "how things are" as 
opposed to the engineers focus on "how things ought to be". The distinction mirrors Lundvall’s one between know-why 
and know-how. Notice that the foregoing views have been criticized by proponents of the "new economics of science" 
(see David and Dasgupta (1994) suggesting that science and technology primarily differ in terms of the ethos of the two 
communities concerning rules of disclosure of results, rules of attribution, etc.          
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9
 A classic example may be found in the aircraft industry. The introduction of the turbojet spurred major advances in 
aerodynamics, aerothermodynamics and subsequently magnetothermodynamics, as further technological advances (e.g. 
higher speed) required a better understanding of underlying properties (Rosenberg, 1982; Constant, 1980).     
10
 The expression is due to Freeman (1982). 
11
 In this respect, it is quite interesting for example to read the documents written by academics and/or government 
officers to support funding for the emerging field of molecular biology in the 1950s-60s. Most of them do actually 
mention the potential benefits that scientific research in this area might have borne in the long run in terms of medical 
applications. However, in practice those considerations played a very minor role in the decision-making processes on how 
much and how actually funding molecular biology in the various European countries (See Krige (2000), Strasser (2000). 
12
 For detailed discussions see Mowery (1981), Rosenberg (1982), Mowery and Rosenberg (1998), Nelson (1993), 
Freeman and Soete (1997), Pavitt (2000), Chandler (1977) and (1990), Hounsell (1996). 
13
 More on all these points in Freeman and Soete (1997), Freeman (1994), Dosi (1988), Pavitt (2000). 
14
 The classical example is biotechnology, where inventors - e.g. typically new specialized biotechnology firms (NBFs) - 
do not control the resources needed to develop the product,  to go through the clinical trials and all the procedures needed 
to have the drug approved by regulatory agencies like the FDA and to market them. Under these circumstances,  NBFs 
are in practice forced to license their invention to big pharmaceutical companies, thereby foregoing a large share of the 
profits generated by the sales of the drug (Teece, 1986). 
15
 It is not possible to discuss here the underlying theoretical debates, ranging from "patent races models" to more 
reasonable "markets for technologies" analyses, all the way to evolutionary models of appropriability. Among many 
others see Stomeman (1995); Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001); Winter (1987). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
